9780387718279-c1.zip

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side channel attack security
9780387718279-c1.zip
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<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta name="generator" content="pdf2htmlEX"> <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge,chrome=1"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://static.pudn.com/base/css/base.min.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://static.pudn.com/base/css/fancy.min.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://static.pudn.com/prod/directory_preview_static/6257928560196e4b84b35cb8/raw.css"> <script src="https://static.pudn.com/base/js/compatibility.min.js"></script> <script src="https://static.pudn.com/base/js/pdf2htmlEX.min.js"></script> <script> try{ pdf2htmlEX.defaultViewer = new pdf2htmlEX.Viewer({}); }catch(e){} </script> <title></title> </head> <body> <div id="sidebar" style="display: none"> <div id="outline"> </div> </div> <div id="pf1" class="pf w0 h0" data-page-no="1"><div class="pc pc1 w0 h0"><img class="bi x0 y0 w1 h1" alt="" src="https://static.pudn.com/prod/directory_preview_static/6257928560196e4b84b35cb8/bg1.jpg"><div class="t m0 x1 h2 y1 ff1 fs0 fc0 sc0 ls0 ws0">Chapter<span class="_ _0"> </span>2</div><div class="t m0 x1 h3 y2 ff1 fs1 fc0 sc0 ls1 ws0">Intr<span class="_ _1"></span>oduction<span class="_"> </span>to<span class="_"> </span>Side-Channel<span class="_"> </span>Attacks</div><div class="t m0 x1 h4 y3 ff1 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls2 ws0">Franc<span class="_ _2"></span><span class="ls3">&#184;<span class="_ _3"></span>ois-Xa<span class="_ _1"></span>vier<span class="_"> </span>Standaert</span></div><div class="t m0 x1 h5 y4 ff1 fs3 fc0 sc0 ls4 ws0">2.1<span class="_ _4"> </span>Introduction</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y5 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">A<span class="_ _5"> </span>cryptographic<span class="_ _5"> </span>primitiv<span class="_ _1"></span>e<span class="_ _5"> </span>can<span class="_ _5"> </span>be<span class="_ _5"> </span>considered<span class="_ _5"> </span>from<span class="_ _5"> </span>two<span class="_ _5"> </span>points<span class="_ _5"> </span>of<span class="_ _5"> </span>vie<span class="_ _1"></span>w:<span class="_ _5"> </span>on<span class="_ _5"> </span>the<span class="_ _5"> </span>one</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y6 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">hand,<span class="_ _0"> </span>it<span class="_ _0"> </span>can<span class="_ _0"> </span>be<span class="_ _6"> </span>vie<span class="_ _1"></span>wed<span class="_ _0"> </span>as<span class="_ _6"> </span>an<span class="_ _0"> </span>abstract<span class="_ _0"> </span>mathematical<span class="_ _0"> </span>object<span class="_ _6"> </span>or<span class="_ _0"> </span>black<span class="_ _0"> </span>box<span class="_ _0"> </span>(i.e.,<span class="_ _6"> </span>a<span class="_ _0"> </span>trans-</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y7 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">formation,<span class="_ _7"> </span>possibly<span class="_ _7"> </span>parameterized<span class="_ _7"> </span>by<span class="_ _7"> </span>a<span class="_ _7"> </span>ke<span class="_ _1"></span>y<span class="_ _8"></span>,<span class="_ _7"> </span>turning<span class="_ _7"> </span>some<span class="_ _7"> </span>input<span class="_ _7"> </span>into<span class="_ _7"> </span>some<span class="_ _7"> </span>output);</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y8 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">on<span class="_ _7"> </span>the<span class="_ _5"> </span>other<span class="_ _7"> </span>hand,<span class="_ _5"> </span>this<span class="_ _7"> </span>primitive<span class="_ _7"> </span>will<span class="_ _7"> </span><span class="ff3 ls5">in<span class="_ _5"> </span>&#64257;ne<span class="_ _7"> </span><span class="ff2">have<span class="_ _7"> </span>to<span class="_ _7"> </span>be<span class="_ _7"> </span>implemented<span class="_ _5"> </span>in<span class="_ _5"> </span>a<span class="_ _7"> </span>program</span></span></div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y9 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">that<span class="_ _6"> </span>will<span class="_ _6"> </span>run<span class="_ _6"> </span>on<span class="_ _6"> </span>a<span class="_ _6"> </span>giv<span class="_ _1"></span>en<span class="_ _6"> </span>processor<span class="_ _1"></span>,<span class="_ _6"> </span>in<span class="_ _6"> </span>a<span class="_ _6"> </span>gi<span class="_ _1"></span>ven<span class="_ _6"> </span>en<span class="_ _8"></span>vironment,<span class="_ _6"> </span>and<span class="_ _6"> </span>will<span class="_ _6"> </span>therefore<span class="_ _0"> </span>present</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 ya ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">speci&#64257;c<span class="_ _5"> </span>characteristics.<span class="_ _5"> </span>The<span class="_ _5"> </span>&#64257;rst<span class="_ _5"> </span>point<span class="_ _5"> </span>of<span class="_ _5"> </span>view<span class="_ _7"> </span>is<span class="_ _5"> </span>the<span class="_ _5"> </span>one<span class="_ _5"> </span>of<span class="_ _9"> </span>&#8220;classical&#8221;<span class="_ _5"> </span>cryptanal-</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 yb ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">ysis;<span class="_ _a"> </span>the<span class="_ _a"> </span>second<span class="_ _a"> </span>one<span class="_ _a"> </span>is<span class="_ _a"> </span>the<span class="_ _a"> </span>one<span class="_ _a"> </span>of<span class="_ _a"> </span>physical<span class="_ _a"> </span>security<span class="_ _8"></span>.<span class="_ _a"> </span>Physical<span class="_ _a"> </span>attacks<span class="_ _a"> </span>on<span class="_ _a"> </span>crypto-</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 yc ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">graphic<span class="_ _6"> </span>de<span class="_ _1"></span>vices<span class="_ _6"> </span>take<span class="_ _b"> </span>adv<span class="_ _1"></span>antage<span class="_ _6"> </span>of<span class="_ _b"> </span>implementation-speci&#64257;c<span class="_ _6"> </span>characteristics<span class="_ _6"> </span>to<span class="_ _6"> </span>recov<span class="_ _1"></span>er</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 yd ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">the<span class="_ _a"> </span>secret<span class="_ _9"> </span>parameters<span class="_ _a"> </span>in<span class="_ _8"></span>volv<span class="_ _1"></span>ed<span class="_ _a"> </span>in<span class="_ _9"> </span>the<span class="_ _a"> </span>computation.<span class="_ _9"> </span>They<span class="_ _a"> </span>are<span class="_ _9"> </span>therefore<span class="_ _a"> </span>much<span class="_ _9"> </span>less</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 ye ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">general<span class="_ _5"> </span>&#8211;<span class="_ _5"> </span>since<span class="_ _5"> </span>speci&#64257;c<span class="_ _5"> </span>to<span class="_ _5"> </span>a<span class="_ _5"> </span>giv<span class="_ _1"></span>en<span class="_ _5"> </span>implementation<span class="_ _5"> </span>&#8211;<span class="_ _5"> </span>but<span class="_ _5"> </span>often<span class="_ _5"> </span>much<span class="_ _5"> </span>more<span class="_ _5"> </span>power<span class="_ _8"></span>-</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 yf ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">ful<span class="_ _7"> </span>than<span class="_ _7"> </span>classical<span class="_ _7"> </span>cryptanalysis<span class="_ _7"> </span>and<span class="_ _7"> </span>are<span class="_ _7"> </span>considered<span class="_ _7"> </span>very<span class="_ _0"> </span>seriously<span class="_ _7"> </span>by<span class="_ _7"> </span>cryptographic</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y10 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">de<span class="_ _1"></span>vices<span class="_ _0"> </span>manufacturers.</div><div class="t m0 x2 h6 y11 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">Such<span class="_ _a"> </span>physical<span class="_ _9"> </span>attacks<span class="_ _a"> </span>are<span class="_ _9"> </span>numerous<span class="_ _a"> </span>and<span class="_ _a"> </span>can<span class="_ _9"> </span>be<span class="_ _a"> </span>classi&#64257;ed<span class="_ _9"> </span>in<span class="_ _a"> </span>many<span class="_ _9"> </span>ways.<span class="_ _a"> </span>The</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y12 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">literature<span class="_ _0"> </span>usually<span class="_ _0"> </span>sorts<span class="_ _0"> </span>them<span class="_ _0"> </span>among<span class="_ _0"> </span>two<span class="_ _0"> </span>orthogonal<span class="_ _0"> </span>axes:</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y13 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls6 ws0">1.<span class="_ _c"> </span>In<span class="_ _8"></span>vasi<span class="_ _1"></span>ve<span class="_ _5"> </span><span class="ff3 ls4">vs.<span class="_ _9"> </span></span><span class="ls5">non-in<span class="_ _1"></span>v<span class="_ _1"></span>asi<span class="_ _1"></span>ve:<span class="_ _5"> </span>In<span class="_ _1"></span>v<span class="_ _1"></span>asiv<span class="_ _1"></span>e<span class="_ _5"> </span>attacks<span class="_ _9"> </span>require<span class="_ _9"> </span>depackaging<span class="_ _9"> </span>the<span class="_ _9"> </span>chip<span class="_ _5"> </span>to<span class="_ _9"> </span>get</span></div><div class="t m0 x3 h6 y14 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">direct<span class="_ _6"> </span>access<span class="_ _6"> </span>to<span class="_ _6"> </span>its<span class="_ _6"> </span>inside<span class="_ _6"> </span>components;<span class="_ _6"> </span>a<span class="_ _6"> </span>typical<span class="_ _0"> </span>example<span class="_ _b"> </span>of<span class="_ _6"> </span>this<span class="_ _6"> </span>is<span class="_ _6"> </span>the<span class="_ _6"> </span>connection</div><div class="t m0 x3 h6 y15 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">of<span class="_ _a"> </span>a<span class="_ _a"> </span>wire<span class="_ _a"> </span>on<span class="_ _a"> </span>a<span class="_ _a"> </span>data<span class="_ _a"> </span>b<span class="_ _1"></span>us<span class="_ _a"> </span>to<span class="_ _a"> </span>see<span class="_ _a"> </span>the<span class="_ _a"> </span>data<span class="_ _a"> </span>transfers.<span class="_ _a"> </span>A<span class="_ _a"> </span>non-in<span class="_ _8"></span>vasi<span class="_ _1"></span>ve<span class="_ _a"> </span>attack<span class="_ _a"> </span>only</div><div class="t m0 x3 h6 y16 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">exploits<span class="_ _a"> </span>externally<span class="_ _a"> </span>av<span class="_ _8"></span>ailable<span class="_ _d"> </span>information<span class="_ _a"> </span>(the<span class="_ _d"> </span>emission<span class="_ _a"> </span>of<span class="_ _d"> </span>which<span class="_ _a"> </span>is,<span class="_ _a"> </span>howe<span class="_ _1"></span>ver<span class="_ _8"></span>,</div><div class="t m0 x3 h6 y17 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">often<span class="_ _0"> </span>unintentional)<span class="_ _0"> </span>such<span class="_ _0"> </span>as<span class="_ _0"> </span>running<span class="_ _0"> </span>time,<span class="_ _0"> </span>power<span class="_ _6"> </span>consumption.</div><div class="t m0 x1 h6 y18 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">2.<span class="_ _c"> </span>Activ<span class="_ _8"></span>e<span class="_ _9"> </span><span class="ff3 ls4">vs.<span class="_ _9"> </span></span><span class="ls3">passiv<span class="_ _1"></span>e:<span class="_ _5"> </span>Activ<span class="_ _1"></span>e<span class="_ _5"> </span>attacks<span class="_ _9"> </span>try<span class="_ _5"> </span>to<span class="_ _9"> </span>tamper<span class="_ _5"> </span>with<span class="_ _9"> </span>the<span class="_ _9"> </span>devices&#8217;<span class="_ _7"> </span>proper<span class="_ _9"> </span>func-</span></div><div class="t m0 x3 h6 y19 ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">tioning,<span class="_ _0"> </span>for<span class="_ _6"> </span>example,<span class="_ _0"> </span>fault-induction<span class="_ _6"> </span>attacks<span class="_ _0"> </span>will<span class="_ _0"> </span>try<span class="_ _0"> </span>to<span class="_ _0"> </span>induce<span class="_ _0"> </span>errors<span class="_ _6"> </span>in<span class="_ _0"> </span>the<span class="_ _0"> </span>com-</div><div class="t m0 x3 h6 y1a ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls5 ws0">putation.<span class="_ _7"> </span>As<span class="_ _5"> </span>opposed,<span class="_ _7"> </span>passive<span class="_ _7"> </span>attacks<span class="_ _7"> </span>will<span class="_ _5"> </span>simply<span class="_ _7"> </span>observe<span class="_ _7"> </span>the<span class="_ _5"> </span>devices<span class="_ _7"> </span>behavior</div><div class="t m0 x3 h6 y1b ff2 fs2 fc0 sc0 ls3 ws0">during<span class="_ _0"> </span>their<span class="_ _0"> </span>processing,<span class="_ _0"> </span>without<span class="_ _0"> </span>disturbing<span class="_ _0"> </span>it.</div><div class="t m0 x1 h7 y1c ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls7 ws0">F<span class="_ _8"></span>.-X.<span class="_ _b"> </span>Standaert<span class="_ _6"> </span>(<span class="ff4 ls4">B<span class="ff2">)</span></span></div><div class="t m0 x1 h8 y1d ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls8 ws0">UCL<span class="_ _b"> </span>Crypto<span class="_ _6"> </span>Group,<span class="_ _6"> </span>Place<span class="_ _6"> </span>du<span class="_ _6"> </span>Lev<span class="_ _1"></span>ant<span class="_ _b"> </span>3,<span class="_ _6"> </span>B-1348<span class="_ _6"> </span>Louvain-la-Neuve,<span class="_ _b"> </span>Belgium</div><div class="t m0 x1 h8 y1e ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls4 ws0">e-mail:<span class="_ _b"> </span>fstandae@uclouvain.be</div><div class="t m0 x1 h8 y1f ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls4 ws0">Postdoctoral<span class="_ _b"> </span>researcher<span class="_ _6"> </span>of<span class="_ _6"> </span>the<span class="_ _6"> </span>Belgian<span class="_ _6"> </span>Fund<span class="_ _6"> </span>for<span class="_ _6"> </span>Scienti&#64257;c<span class="_ _b"> </span>Research<span class="_ _6"> </span>(FNRS).</div><div class="t m0 x1 h8 y20 ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls8 ws0">I.M.R.<span class="_ _6"> </span>V<span class="_ _e"></span>erbauwhede<span class="_ _6"> </span>(ed.),<span class="_ _b"> </span><span class="ff3 ls4">Secure<span class="_ _b"> </span>Integr<span class="_ _1"></span>ated<span class="_ _b"> </span>Circuits<span class="_ _b"> </span>and<span class="_ _6"> </span>Systems<span class="ff2">,</span></span></div><div class="t m0 x1 h8 y21 ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls8 ws0">Integrated<span class="_ _b"> </span>Circuits<span class="_ _6"> </span>and<span class="_ _6"> </span>Systems,<span class="_ _6"> </span>DOI<span class="_ _b"> </span>10.1007/978-0-387-71829-3</div><div class="t m0 x4 h8 y22 ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls9 ws0">2,</div><div class="t m0 x5 h9 y23 ff2 fs5 fc0 sc0 ls4 ws0">C</div><div class="t m0 x1 ha y24 ff5 fs6 fc0 sc0 ls4 ws0">&#58882;</div><div class="t m0 x6 h8 y25 ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls4 ws0">Springer<span class="_ _b"> </span>Science+Business<span class="_ _6"> </span>Media,<span class="_ _6"> </span>LLC<span class="_ _6"> </span>2010</div><div class="t m0 x7 h8 y26 ff2 fs4 fc0 sc0 ls9 ws0">27</div></div><div class="pi" data-data='{"ctm":[2.037103,0.000000,0.000000,2.037103,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div></div> </body> </html>
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